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Abstract: This paper defends the deflationary character of two recent views regarding 
scientific representation, namely RIG Hughes’ DDI model and the inferential 
conception. It is first argued that these views’ deflationism is akin to the homonymous 
position in discussions regarding the nature of truth. There, we are invited to consider 
the platitudes that the predicate “true” obeys at the level of practice, disregarding any 
deeper, or more substantive, account of its nature. More generally, for any concept X, a 
deflationary approach is then defined in opposition to a substantive approach, where a 
substantive approach to X is an analysis of X in terms of some property P, or relation R, 
accounting for and explaining the standard use of X. It then becomes possible to 
characterize a deflationary view of scientific representation in three distinct senses, 
namely: a “no-theory” view, a “minimalist” view, and a “use-based” view – in line with 
three standard deflationary responses in the philosophical literature on truth. It is then 
argued that both the DDI model and the inferential conception may be suitably 
understood in any of these three different senses. The application of these deflationary 
‘hermeneutics’ moreover yields significant improvements on the DDI model, which 
bring it closer to the inferential conception. It is finally argued that what these 
approaches have in common – the key to any deflationary account of scientific 
representation – is the denial that scientific representation may be ultimately reduced to 
any substantive explanatory property of sources, or targets, or their relations. 
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1. Scientific Representation: The State of Play 
 
  
 ‘Science represents through its models - and this representational aim is 
characteristic, or defining, of its model-building activity’. As stated – in this minimal 
and restricted sense – this is as uncontroversial a claim as one may encounter in 
contemporary philosophy of science. But what is it that science represents, and how 
does it do it? These are much harder questions, and there is intense debate nowadays 
amongst philosophers regarding how best to address them. i 
 
 The various attempts to answer these questions can be distinguished in a number 
of different ways. In this paper I focus on one particular distinction between what I call 
‘substantive’ and ‘deflationary’ accounts of representation. The former type claims that 
representation is some substantive or objective property or relation; the latter, by 
contrast, ‘deflates’ the notion of representation by claiming that there is no substantive 
property or relation at stake. These terms will be defined more fully below. Substantive 
accounts have traditionally been, implicitly if not explicitly, the norm in much of the 
discussion of scientific representation. Bas van Fraassen and Ronald Giere have often 
been thought to defend substantive analyses of representation (as isomorphism and 
similarity, respectively), although their views turn out to be in fact more subtle than has 
been supposed – and, in particular, their most recent and considered views are 
decisively deflationary (Giere, 2004; Van Fraassen, 2008). More recently, champions of 
substantive accounts include Pincock (2012), who defends structural isomorphism, and 
Weisberg (2013), who defends similarity; yet other attempts at substantive accounts 
include Bartels (2006), who defends homomorphism, French (2003) and his disciples, 
who defend partial isomorphism, and Contessa (2007), who defends a substantive 
version of the inferential conception. In all these cases the ostensive aim is to analyze 
away representation in virtue of some other relation or property, or set of relations and 
properties, that provide its reductive base.  
 
 In other words, these accounts are both substantive and reductive. It is worth 
noting that it is not the case that, for any concept X, a substantive account of it should 
be reductive. It is important in particular to distinguish ‘primitivist’ accounts from what 
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I will in the paper consider strictly ‘deflationary’ accounts: they are by no means the 
same. True, a ‘primitivist’ account about a concept X starts from the recognition that X 
may not be reduced or analysed away. But this is because, for a primitivist, X is 
substantive yet unanalysable. On such a view X is an explanatory primitive property or 
relation that bears no reduction to any other concept or set of concepts Y. For 
illustration it is instructive to consider the case of laws, causation, or time. A primitivist 
about these concepts claims them to be explanatory primitives. For instance, David 
Armstrong is widely held to defend primitivism about laws; and Tim Maudlin is a 
primitivist about (the passage of) time. Wesley Salmon may have been a primitivist 
about causal processes, etc. By contrast, a Humean considers all these concepts to have 
a problematic status calling for analysis in terms of other concepts that he or she 
considers to be unproblematic. The unproblematic concepts from the Humean point of 
view are empirically accessible – thus laws are to be reduced to regularities; causation is 
to be reduced to probability, typically understood as frequency; and time is to be 
reduced to open conjunctive forks, or oriented correlations. None of these views is 
deflationary in the sense that I will develop in this paper.  
 
 Another striking example of the distinction that I am appealing to here can be 
found in debates surrounding the nature of knowledge. Many philosophers have 
attempted to analyse ‘knowledge’ away in terms of notions they regard to be self-
explanatory, or at least less obscure, such as justification, truth, and belief. Yet others 
have resisted any such analysis, claiming instead that knowledge is an explanatory 
primitive that requires no analysis (notably Williamson 2000). Along the same lines, a 
primitivist about representation claims that representation is an explanatory primitive 
which bears no further reduction. It should thus be clear that this view is a non-
reductive kind of substantive account – certainly not an analysis –, and should be 
distinguished from both the deflationary and the reductive kind of substantive accounts 
that will be discussed here. ii 
 
 Deflationary views or accounts of scientific representation are inaugurated by 
Hughes (1997), include explicitly Suárez (2004) and Van Fraassen (2008) and – on the 
version of deflationism defended here – implicitly Giere (2004) and Elgin (2009). On 
such views, representation is not a substantive property or relation. Some of these 
deflationary views take it to be no property or relation at all; others take it to be a 
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property or relation, but not a substantive one – in some precise sense to be specified. 
Deflationary accounts are not typically reductionist – indeed it would be strange to first 
claim that representation is not a substantive property, or no property at all, and then go 
on to attempt to analyse it away anyway. (But note that the difficulty here is not logical 
or conceptual, but a pragmatic difficulty concerning the possible use of a reductive 
deflationism – for if X already fails to be, or to correspond to, a substantive property or 
relation then what cognitive gain could there be in reducing it to further deflationary 
properties or relations?) All the deflationary accounts of representation reviewed here 
(including ‘used-based’ accounts) are non-reductive in the weaker sense that they either 
do not provide an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, or if they do 
provide such conditions, they claim them to have no explanatory purchase. Hence, the 
deflationary accounts reviewed here give up on the aim to provide an explanatory 
reduction of representation in terms of properties or relations between sources and 
targets, and this is what distinguishes them from reductive substantive accounts.     
 
 A critical issue for the purposes of this paper concerns the relationship between 
representation and model-building practice. In a substantive account this relation is 
contingent: if modellers’ practice is appropriate and effective it will latch on the 
relevant features of representation, but there is no logical or conceptual necessity for 
this to be so – the practice may in principle be fundamentally misguided. It is first the 
case that at the individual level, modellers can be better or worse at grasping the select 
set of features of a source that holds the representational relation R to the target. While 
collectively, there is nothing to guarantee that the practice is in any way geared towards 
a successful appraisal of the features and relations in question. In other words scientific 
practice may be more or less proficient in getting at genuine representational relations. 
At best, we can take scientific practice to provide some defeasible evidence for or 
against particular substantive accounts, and this only if we accept that our account of 
representation should aim to be descriptive, or explanatory, of the actual practice.iii In 
other words, if representation is a substantive relation, or property, then the practice of 
model-building provides at best an empirical benchmark to judge how appropriate the 
different accounts of this substantive relation are. But the practice and the account may 
in principle – i.e. logically or conceptually – differ markedly. 
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 By contrast, I argue in this paper, one thing that all deflationary accounts have in 
common is that the agreement between representation and model-building practice is, if 
not a priori, at least conceptually much tighter– for it turns out that on these accounts 
representation cannot be contradicted by the norms that inform that practice, or be 
explicitly at variance with them. On some deflationary accounts this is because there is 
nothing that the concept of representation per se says about representational or model 
building practice; on other deflationary accounts, representation is itself constituted in 
the practice. Either way representational practice is not an ‘empirical benchmark’ 
against which to judge our theories of representation. Of course, individual modellers – 
even whole communities or groups of scientists – may, whether intentionally or not, 
misrepresent, in the sense that they may mistakenly ascribe the wrong sources, or the 
wrong features of such sources to the wrong targets, or mistaken features thereof. 
However, whenever they do, there must be some failure on their part to follow the 
constitutive norms of the practice that explains their mistake. iv For it is impossible, on a 
deflationary account, for the concept of representation in any area of science to be at 
variance with the norms that govern representational practice in that area. Rather, 
representation in that area, if it is anything at all, is nothing but that practice. v 
 
 Now, beginning with Hughes (1997) and culminating in Van Fraassen (2008), 
the deflationary tradition has shown increasing concern with reductive substantive 
accounts (i.e. attempts at explanatory definitions) of representation. Consequently, I 
argue, the role of practice has shifted from a potential arbiter in disputes between 
accounts of representation towards a constitutive element of representation itself. In a 
deflationary approach, as I argue in this paper, practice does not merely adjudicate 
competing accounts of the concept. Rather to the extent that there is any concept at all, 
practice fully informs the concept. As a consequence, the functions and roles of 
representation may not be defined a priori independently of representational practice – 
but can be fully articulated only against the background of practice. And although this 
bare and general deflationary thesis seems to be becoming popular, its mere statement 
still leaves open important details, and is open to several interpretations.  
 
 
2. What is Deflationism? Three Views. 
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 My main claim in this paper is that both Hughes’ DDI model and my own 
inferential conception are deflationary accounts of scientific representation in some 
relevant respects. In order to make the claim precise I need to first characterize what 
those relevant respects are. My strategy is to employ an analogy with the debates 
regarding the nature of truth within metaphysics and the philosophy of language. By 
means of reference to those debates, I shall attempt to distinguish three different senses 
of “deflationism”, or more generally three distinct deflationary approaches to any 
concept: The ‘no-theory’, ‘abstract minimalism’ and ‘use-based’ approaches. The 
implications for scientific representation and, in particular, for the sort of philosophical 
work that is appropriately relevant to them, seem different in all three cases. However, 
in sections three and four, I go on to apply these three deflationary approaches to the 
DDI model and the inferential conception, and I will then claim that there is something 
that these three approaches have in common after all. They all emphasize the essential 
link to practice mentioned above that makes a substantial definitional approach helpless 
or impossible. An inquiry into the nature of scientific representation, on any of these 
views, is essentially an inquiry into a form of practice. vi Thus I shall end by urging 
philosophers of science to focus on the ways in which any deflationary approach may 
contribute to this common goal. vii  
 
 It will help us to understand deflationism if we first provide a sketch of its 
opponent – substantialism.  A substantive analysis of some concept X is a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions that defines the concept and moreover explains its 
use. The defining conditions of the concept are thus also conditions for its use, which 
stipulate under what conditions the concept applies. Let us, for instance, consider the 
truth concept. A substantive analysis establishes some conditions that define the nature 
of the ‘truth’ predicate. Whatever property truth is then taken to be, it is possible to 
explain any correct or legitimate application of the predicate by reference to these 
conditions. The conditions may stipulate a particular type of relation that must obtain 
between on the one hand propositions, or sentences, and facts on the other hand. Or it 
may stipulate some property that propositions, or sentences, need to have in order to 
legitimately be said to be true, or truth-apt. viii 
 
 In accordance with this terminology, three substantive theories of truth may be 
said to have essentially emerged in the literature so far, which we may refer to as the 
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correspondence, coherence and pragmatist theories or accounts of the nature of truth. 
They all begin by accepting the equivalence or disquotational schema, which we may 
state as follows: ix 
 
 The Disquotational Schema (DS): ‘P’ is true if and only if P.  x 
 
 Each of the theories reviewed then establishes a set of defining conditions for 
the predicate “true” that are supposedly necessary and sufficient for legitimate 
applications of the predicate in whatever context. These conditions certainly include the 
(DS) but will add something else substantial in addition – whether a relation or a 
property of sentences. Yet, what each theory adds differs dramatically. Thus, the 
correspondence theory adds the idea that truth is correspondence to the facts – and 
understands this as a substantive or metaphysical relation between sentences and facts 
(the relata of the correspondence relation). The coherence theory adds the idea that truth 
is coherence with the rest of (an agent’s) beliefs, and again understands coherence as a 
logical relation amongst sentences. For the so-called ‘pragmatist’ theory, truth is 
supposed to consist in the property of cognitive utility in accordance to the maxim often 
ascribed to James: “to be true is to be useful to believe”. xi 
 
 The distinguishing mark of a substantive theory of truth (and by extension, of 
any concept) is therefore the laying down of conditions that define the concept and that 
moreover explain its use. Deflationary accounts, by contrast, give up on at least one of 
these distinct aims – if not both the definitional and the explanatory aim. Thus these 
accounts have in common the rejection of a defining set of application conditions that 
explain the use of the concept. In particular, with respect to truth, these accounts take it 
that there is no substantive nature to truth (i.e. no explanatory nature with respect to the 
use of the corresponding predicate) to be captured by philosophical analysis. Naturally, 
there are two ways to deny that such an explanatory analysis is possible. In the first 
instance by denying that an analysis is possible full stop; in the second instance, by 
accepting that an analysis is possible while denying that it is the kind of analysis that 
will shed explanatory light on our use of the concept. Thus many deflationists accept 
that truth is nominally a property, but deny that it is a substantive one – i.e. one that can 
be employed for explanatory purposes. 
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 I want to argue that we may helpfully distinguish in the literature on truth three 
different deflationary approaches. xii I shall refer to them as the ‘no-theory’, ‘abstract 
minimalism’, and ‘use-based’ approaches. I identify the first type of approach roughly 
with the so-called ‘redundancy’ theory of truth, in particular as espoused by Frank 
Ramsey. The second type of approach is best characterized by Crispin Wright’s 
‘minimalism’ about truth. The third and final type is roughly suggested by Paul 
Horwich’s variety of deflationism. All of these views have some explicit or implicit 
debt to Wittgenstein’s middle and late period thought, and indeed the core of what they 
share in common - when considered as generalized deflationary accounts of any concept 
- is perhaps some late Wittgenstenian attitude to conceptual analysis. Nevertheless, they 
do differ in the way they apply the central insight – and they correspondingly differ in 
some central claims they make regarding truth. I shall review them in turn with an eye 
on the central Wittgensteinian insight they share in common. 
 
 One of the first explicitly deflationary accounts of truth appears in Frank P. 
Ramsey’s works, in particular in “Facts and Propositions” (1927). The relevant 
passages have been discussed extensively, and Ramsey is often credited on their 
account with the inauguration of so called redundancy theories of truth. The basic 
thought is that the (DS) exhausts what we may informatively say regarding the truth 
predicate. Accordingly, to assert of some proposition ‘P’ that it is true is to assert 
nothing over and above whatever ‘P’ itself asserts. Hence the redundancy theory of 
truth extracts from the (DS) the idea that ‘true’ denotes no substantial property. The 
predicate ‘true’ is instead redundant, in the sense that to predicate of any proposition 
that it is ‘true’ adds nothing to the content of that proposition. There is no substantial 
property that all true propositions share. The ascription of the predicate ‘true’ to a 
proposition is rather taken to possess only a kind of honorific value: it merely expresses 
the strength of someone’s endorsement of a particular proposition. xiii Truth is, if it is a 
property at all, a redundant property. xiv 
 
 For our purposes here we may focus on the part of the redundancy theory that 
most closely approaches the view that the terms ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ do not admit a 
theoretical elucidation or analysis, but that, since they may be eliminated in principle – 
if not in practice – by disquotation, they do not in fact require such an analysis. I will 
take this implicitly to mean that there are no non-trivial necessary and sufficient 
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conditions for these concepts. xv The generalization of this ‘no-theory theory’ for any 
given putative concept X is the thought that X neither possesses nor requires necessary 
and sufficient conditions because it is not in fact a ‘genuine’, explanatory, or substantive 
concept. The most that we can aim for is a more or less accurate account of the norms 
that appear to govern the use of the corresponding term; but this account does not (and 
cannot) provide an explanation of that use – it merely summarizes it.  
 
 Let us now move on to the second type of deflationary account of truth that I 
shall discuss, namely the view defended by Crispin Wright in his book Truth and 
Objectivity (1992). Wright refers to his view as ‘minimalism’ and he acknowledges that 
this can create confusion with other extant deflationary views that also go under that 
name (Wright, 1992, p. X). For this reason, among others, I will sometimes refer to 
Wright’s view more specifically as ‘abstract minimalism’. Wright believes that truth is a 
genuine property ruled by an abstract norm, and that this norm is provably distinct from 
the norm of warranted assertability. The view is nonetheless broadly ‘deflationary’ 
because the account of truth thus provided does not explain any of the actual uses of the 
‘truth’ predicate. What is more, there is no reason to suppose that such an explanatory 
account is forthcoming for the truth concept – for according to Wright there is a gap 
between the abstract property of truth and any concrete norm of use in any particular 
domain where it may be used. In order to explain a particular use we need to resort to 
further norms and properties that operate in the domain of the discourse where the 
predicate is employed – and there is no reason to believe that such norms will be unique 
or universal across domains. 
 
 The disquotational schema (DS) on this view just provides one of the platitudes 
of the truth predicate that can at best partially characterize the concept abstractly, but 
fails to explain any of the concrete uses of the concept in practice. There are, according 
to Wright, other platitudes of truth such as those “concerning negation and 
correspondence; and which we may wish to see augmented by considerations about 
stability and absoluteness”. xvi Besides, the (DS) itself is a consequence, for Wright, of 
the more fundamental thesis that to assert is to present as true. But to state all these 
platitudes does not add anything substantially explanatory to the concept. So while truth 
is legitimately a property, which is abstractly characterized by the platitudes, it is a 
property that cannot explain anything, in particular it fails to explain the norms that 
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govern its very use in practice. For that sort of explanation, Wright contends, we need to 
appeal to additional factors, which will be distinct for each different context of use, or 
domain of discourse. There is no general account of the use of truth across domains, and 
no comprehensive universal pattern to the application of the concept throughout. Hence 
‘abstract minimalism’ ably combines a general description of the platitudes that 
characterize the abstract concept with a pluralistic understanding of its diverse means of 
application. As we will see this combination has a straightforward analogy in the case of 
scientific representation. 
 
 Let me finally consider what I will refer to as the ‘use-based’ account and 
which, although sometimes known as “minimalism”, is very different from the kind of 
“abstract minimalism” that I just reviewed. On this account, which we may most closely 
associate to the work of Paul Horwich, truth is nominally a property, although not a 
substantive or explanatory one, which is essentially defined by the platitudes of its use 
of the predicate in practice. So the DS on this account fully defines truth – there is 
nothing else at all to say in addition. Truth is entirely captured by the schema and thus 
revealed to be a useful vehicle for semantic ascent (from the object language where P 
obtains to the meta-language where “’P’ is true” obtains) and generalization (in 
sentences such as “whatever Peter says is always true” or “she will never lie”). There 
are on this account no purposes beyond these pragmatic ones that the predicate “true” 
plays in our language, and there are no further properties beyond these formal ones that 
it may possibly refer to. 
 
 Amongst all the deflationary views reviewed, Horwich’s is arguably closer to a 
pure ‘use-theory” of truth; it certainly comes closer to the slogan that “the meaning of 
the truth predicate is given by its use”. The key differences with the other two accounts 
concern this close definitional connection with use. Thus the ‘no-theory theory’ flatly 
rejects that truth may be analysed – either by connecting it to use, or any other means. 
This is a crucial difference because according to the ‘no-theory theory’ truth is simply 
not a property and has no analysis, while the ‘use-based’ view accepts that it is a 
property and moreover one susceptible of philosophical analysis, but locates this 
property entirely in some features of the proper use of the corresponding predicate in a 
linguistic practice. In other words, the use-based minimal approach is reductive in a way 
the no-theory theory patently is not. Both views are deflationary in that they deny that 
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philosophical accounts of ‘truth’ can explain our ordinary uses of ‘truth’ – but they do 
so for different reasons. The ‘no-theory’ view denies that any analysis is possible, while 
use-based minimalism only denies that any explanatory analysis is possible. 
 
 Abstract minimalism too accepts that truth is a property but denies that it is an 
explanatory one. But there is again one major difference with the use-based view. The 
reason why the property of ‘truth’ is not explanatory of the use of the ‘true’ predicate is 
different in both cases. According to use-based minimalism ‘truth’ cannot explain its 
use precisely because it is defined in terms of this use. And nothing that is X can 
explain X itself – in a genuine explanation the explanans and explanandum must be 
distinct. By contrast, abstract minimalism contends that the property of truth is not 
explanatory of its use because the use does not follow from the property in the way the 
explanandum follows from the explanans in a genuine explanation. The property is 
abstract, and does not suffice, on its own, to explain any actual concrete use of the 
predicates. Rather, as was already saw, according to abstract minimalism the platitudes 
of truth – which include the DS – define the concept in the abstract, and do not 
determine or define the use of the corresponding predicate in practice. Any legitimate 
uses of the predicate must of course be in agreement with these ‘abstract’ platitudes; 
however, these platitudes do not suffice to prescribe or fix any of these uses – other 
norms must be invoked in order to explain the different application conditions of the 
corresponding predicate in different domains.xvii 
 
 I have now provided an outline of the main elements of three distinct 
deflationary approaches to truth: the ‘no-theory’, ‘abstract minimalism’, and ‘use based’ 
approaches. I claim that these three distinct deflationary strategies may be generalised 
and applied to other suitable concepts. xviii In particular, I aim to show that each of these 
‘hermeneutical’ strategies provides a legitimate strategy to deflate scientific 
representation. Each of them, in their own characteristic fashion, determines a possible 
deflationary account of representation. These accounts are distinct – along the lines just 
rehearsed above in relation to truth – but they share in common their refusal to provide 
a substantive reductive account of the practice of scientific representation. xix 
 
 
3. Deflationary Representation: Two Accounts 
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 In this section I review the elements of two accounts of scientific representation 
that have been claimed to be deflationary, namely RIG Hughes’ (1997) DDI model and 
my own inferential conception (2004). I shall defend their deflationary character in due 
course, but first some neutral terminology is needed. We shall say that, in model-
building science, a model source A typically represents a target B. This terminology 
implies no constraints on what types of objects A and B may be: These may be concrete 
or abstract, physical or mathematical, real or imaginary. Neither is it precluding the 
standard view according to which any scientific model must have a target in the real 
world and represent it via relations that hold between the properties of both source and 
target. Indeed, as discussed below, the standard view is constitutive of representation on 
most substantive accounts, which take representation to be a relation – and hence take 
both relata to be real. Yet, the terminology also leaves room for other views that do not 
require sources or targets (or both) to be real, and hence do not require representation to 
be a relation.  
 
 Thus, the types of objects that are sources can vary greatly – from concrete 
physical objects and diagrams to abstract mathematical structures or laws. Besides, 
different sources may represent one and only one target. Thus the solar system may be 
represented both by a concrete array of small balls strung together by means of wires, or 
by Kepler’s three mathematical laws. Targets may also vary: Some models represent 
concrete physical systems and their dynamical evolution, such as the solar system; other 
models represent more general phenomena, or effects, such as the Ising model for phase 
transitions; yet other models represent abstract properties, such as the second law of 
thermodynamics, which, in asserting that entropy increases in a closed system, also 
represents entropy. 
   
 Why are all these instances of ‘scientific representation’ - what do they have in 
common? In line with the distinctions introduced in the first section, we may classify 
responses to this question into two types: substantive and deflationary. Substantive 
approaches aim to provide answers to the question in terms of the properties of sources 
and targets – or, rather, their relation – that constitutes representation. In this paper I 
shall be concerned mainly with the other set of approaches, which we may refer to as 
‘deflationary’ – according to which there is in fact no substantive property or relation 
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that constitutes representation. On these deflationary views what is in common between 
the different cases of representation is rather related to the function that sources play 
with respect to targets, i.e. the uses that they are put to by agents towards their specific 
goals in their particular contexts of inquiry.  
 
 According to Hughes’ Denotation-Demonstration-Interpretation (DDI) account, 
scientific modelling is a three-part relation cum activity (more on the distinction 
between relations and activities later). According to this account a source A represents a 
target B when the following three conditions are met: i) The source stands for the target 
in the sense that it denotes it; ii) Some demonstration is carried out by an agent on the 
model; and iii) The results of this demonstration are then interpreted, so as to apply 
them to the target.  
 
 As an illustration, Hughes (1997) deploys the model that Galileo introduces in 
the Third Day of his Discourses Concerning Two New Sciences. Galileo there describes 
a kinematical problem in exclusively geometrical terms. He goes on to solve the 
problem in geometry, only then to apply the solution to the original kinematical 
problem. Thus he deduces that the space s traversed by a body in uniform motion with 
constant velocity in a given interval t is equal to that traversed by a uniformly 
accelerated body initially at rest, provided that the final speed of the accelerating body 
is twice that of the body in uniform constant motion. 
 
 The DDI model can be applied in a straightforward manner to the example, as 
follows. First, the kinematical situation must be described by means of a geometrical 
diagram that therefore denotes it (Figure 1). Thus Galileo denotes the time t that the 
body takes to traverse the space s by means of the segment AB of a line, and the speed 
of the body at any instant of the interval t by another segment of a line perpendicular to 
the first line. Thus AC denotes the speed of the body at A and BD the speed of the body 
at B. Second, a demonstration must be carried out on the diagram. Galileo demonstrates 
that the area of a rectangular shape ABCD is identical to the area of a triangle ABD’ 
where D’ is twice the value of D. Finally, we need to interpret this result back in the 
terms of the original kinematical problem. By interpreting the overall area covered as 
the space traversed by the body in its motion over the t interval, Galileo infers that the 
time t that a body in uniform motion takes to traverse s is identical to the time taken by 
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a body uniformly accelerated. Whatever the merits of the model, the combination of 
denotation, demonstration, and interpretation constitutes an act of representation, 
according to the DDI account. 
 
 The account is ostensibly deflationary in not providing necessary and sufficient 
conditions for representation; and in the claim that representation is a set of ‘speech 
acts’ (Hughes, 1997, p. 329). However, the overt appeal to denotation turns a 
substantive relation into a necessary condition on representation, thus compromising the 
strength of its deflationism. I discuss this in greater detail in section 4, where I 
endeavour to show that it is possible nonetheless to extend the DDI account in such a 
way as to render it genuinely deflationary.  
 
 At this point I wish to consider an alternative deflationary account of 
representation, the inferential conception, which I have defended in Suárez (2004). On 
this account, representation is characterised as a two-part activity involving the exercise 
of the inferential capacities of the model source (with respect to the target), and the 
setting of what I call representational force of the source towards the target. Both 
components are elements of practice and ensue in relations only in those contexts in 
which the practice’s outputs include the establishment of a particular match or 
comparison between source and target. But even in those cases, the inferential 
conception reveals that representation is properly speaking constituted by the practice 
and not the relation. xx “Capacity” and “force” are proper nouns and may thus be taken 
to implicitly refer to a property. However, when appropriately placed in their context, 
they are best understood to appropriately refer to properties of particular activities 
within a normative practice. Neither predicate picks up a property or relation in the 
objects themselves that play the role of representational targets or sources. (See 
Knuuttila (2009) for a similar claim). 
 
 Let me try to make the claim in full – for both “inferential capacity” and 
“representational force” – by means of a particular example, which I have already 
employed to a similar effect in the past, namely the Forth Rail Bridge. The case for the 
Forth Rail Bridge as a representational target has been thoroughly made by the 
distinguished British art historian Michael Baxandall in his classic book Patterns of 
Intention (1985). What is peculiar about architecture or engineering cases, such as this 
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one, is that the representational sources (the different diagrams and plans for the 
execution and construction of the bridge) precede the actual representational target. 
They are not merely representations of the bridge, but templates for, and instructions 
towards, its construction. It is thus worth reviewing the history of the bridge in some 
detail, since it sheds light on a number of the bridge’s roles as a representational target. 
xxi 
 
 The background to the development of the Forth Rail Bridge is the intense 
competition between rail companies in Northern England and Scotland in the last 
decades of the 19th century. It was government policy to encourage competition, and a 
number of regional firms fiercely invested from 1850’s onwards in developing tracks 
along the east and west coasts of Britain. The main direction of both passenger and 
cargo traffic was south- north of the border and back and - beyond that - between the 
populated conurbations of Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen. Two companies in 
particular competed for traffic northwards from Edinburgh towards Dundee and beyond. 
The Caledonian Railway operated the western tracks, while the North British Railway 
Company owned and run the eastern routes. The western route from Edinburgh to 
Dundee involved a long detour around the main estuaries of the Firth and the Tay, but it 
was at least a continuous train journey. By contrast, the North British Railway 
Company could only bring passengers by track as far as the estuaries, where ferry boats 
would cross the passengers to awaiting trains at the other end. It was a long, 
complicated, and exhausting 3-hour journey to cover the merely 46 straight-line miles 
from Edinburgh to Dundee – and the North British Railway Company and its associated 
companies south and north of the border were quickly losing business to their 
competitors in the western routes.  
 
 The North British Railway Company effectively bridged the Tay in the period 
between 1871 and 1878. But bridging the Forth was a considerably more challenging 
task, given the depth of the berth, the stronger side winds, and the Admiralty’s 
stipulations for navigation under the bridge (to allow navy vessels to reach the 
dockyards at Queensberry). Thus in 1873, the North British Railway Company joined 
forces with another three associated companies with interest in running trains on the 
eastern coast (Great Northern, North Eastern, and Midland) to found the Forth Bridge 
Company, with the sole remit to bridge the Forth for train traffic. The Company 
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commissioned the design and construction to Sir Thomas Bouch – who had just been 
knighted for his work as lead engineer of the just completed iron wrought structure over 
the Tay. Works on the middle pier of the Forth Bridge at Inchgarvie Island had already 
started when disaster struck on the older bridge over the Tay on 28 December 1879. The 
Tay Bridge collapsed bringing down a train with 79 passengers with it – an event that, 
according to Petroski (1995, p. 70) “immediately affected the character of bridge design 
and construction endeavors throughout the world”.  
 
 The history is relevant to both the representational force and inferential 
capacities of all subsequent designs plans and graphs for the Forth Bridge, since it 
reveals the intent of later attempts to bridge the Forth (Figure 2). In particular the 
subsequent engineers, John Fowles and Benjamin Baker, worked under an absolute 
requirement to make sure the design would guarantee bridge stability under the 
strongest side winds imaginable – the board Trade stipulated an equivalence of at least 
56 pounds to the square foot (Baxandall, 1985, p. 19). This led Benjamin Baker – the 
younger partner and chief engineer in charge of the design – to discard both a girder 
bridge of the sort that had been employed at the Tay, and also a suspension bridge – the 
sort that had been originally planned by Bouch for the Forth. Baker instead chose a 
cantilever design – which was a rather novel approach for bridges as large as the one 
planned. xxii  
 
 The main principle in cantilever bridge design is tension-compression. In a 
cantilever bridge the lower arm of each lever is compressed while the upper arm is 
correspondingly in tension. In the central pier by contrast the lower girder is 
compressed while the upper one is in tension. This led Baker to choose different kinds 
of design for the different arms of the levers – those in tension would be built as lattices, 
while those in compression were tubular. These designs were made possible by the very 
recent availability of industrial steel. As ever the driving thought in this design 
concerned resistance to wind strength – Baker judiciously calculated that wind strength 
on the upper arms in tension would be maximal, while the lower arms had to be robust 
to resist greater compression shears. Lattices minimise resistance to wind pressure, 
while tubes maximise resistance to compression shears.  
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 The point of reviewing all these details concerning the bridge design is hopefully 
now clear. Baker and Fowler’s design was driven by a fundamental requirement – 
namely to overcome considerable side shear and torsion. All kinds of critical aspects of 
the design are conducive to the same goal to guarantee that the bridge would withstand 
the strongest side winds. The representational force of the graphs is not just towards ‘a 
bridge across the Forth’, but a very particular bridge capable of sustaining such 
strengths – and one moreover under no circumstances subject to the structural defects 
that led to the Tay bridge debacle. The inferential capacity of the graphic designs is thus 
geared towards showing clearly how – on the basis of the principles applied – a bridge 
built as designed would indeed withstand such shears and stresses. Baker and his 
colleagues thus fixed both the representational force and the inferential capacities of 
their designs, and it is only under a careful understanding of the normative practice of 
civil engineering at the time and other features of the historical context – of the sort 
provided by Baxandall (1985) – that the extent and sense of both features may be 
appreciated.  
 
 This shows that the twofold requirements of representational force and 
inferential capacities capture some of the essential surface features of representation in 
science. The force of a representation (such as the graph reproduced in figure 2) is 
essentially linked to a practice of interpreting features of the graph as standing for 
features of a (possible, but not actual at that time) bridge. The rubric on the graph makes 
the referent explicit, but more than that is required to appreciate the full force of the 
model – including an understanding of the principles of cantilever bridge building, and 
the recognizable shape of the diverse parts (such as tubes, girders, piers, and lattices). 
These principles are also required for an understanding of the design’s inferential 
capacities, but here more must be added, including principles of torsion, compression, 
tension and stress, all of them required for a precise calculation of the strength of the 
side winds that a bridge built in accordance to the specifications would be able to 
withstand.  
 
 Thus there is a close connection, according to the inferential conception, 
between representation and modelling practice. This intimate link between 
representation and the norms of application and inference within model-building 
science is also at the heart of the claim that the inferential conception is a deflationary 
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view. As I argue in section 4, even though the inferential conception may be understood 
in slightly different terms, each different construal issues – through the vital connection 




4. Deflationary Views and Representational Practice. 
 
 Let us quickly take stock of what has been achieved so far. In section 2 I 
reviewed, in connection to truth, three different strategies for ‘deflating’ – or rather 
more simply, displaying the deflationary nature of – any concept: ‘no-theory’, ‘abstract 
minimalism’, ‘use-based’ strategies. In the last section I reviewed in outline the 
elements of two accounts of scientific representation that have been claimed to be 
‘deflationary’: Hughes’ DDI account and the inferential conception. In this section I 
apply these three strategies to the two deflationary accounts of representation. I argue 
that each strategy is in principle applicable, and reveals some of the reasons why 
scientific representation is indeed a deflationary notion on these accounts. 
 
 I will also argue that the DDI account and the inferential account prima facie 
differ in the degree to which they lend themselves to the deflationary strategies; in fact 
the DDI account as originally presented by Hughes turns out to be deflationary in only 
one possible sense, namely the ‘no-theory’ sense. There is, however, a possible 
development of the DDI account that brings it closer to practice in such a way as to 
fulfil the conditions of at least the use-based approach. xxiiiThe development of this 
refined account already shows the deflationary strategies have some heuristic power of 
their own – in the sense that applying them to a particular philosophical approach to any 
concept may lead to improvements on the approach. 
  
 The DDI account is a deflationary approach to representation because, as 
presented by Hughes, it refrains from postulating necessary conditions in terms of 
robust relations between sources and targets. As Hughes (1997, p. 329) writes “Let me 
forestall possible misunderstandings. I am not arguing that denotation, demonstration, 
and interpretation constitute a set of speech acts individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient for an act of theoretical representation to take place”. Hughes is implicitly 
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denying that scientific representation is a substantive explanatory property – or that it 
possesses necessary and sufficient conditions. Nevertheless, there are a few features of 
the DDI account that may lead us to question the strength of its commitment to 
deflationism, and at any rate suggest that the DDI account does not rank very high on 
any ‘deflationary’ scale.  These features all follow from the surprising appeal to 
denotation – surprising since denotation is commonly understood as a substantive 
relation between the denoting sign and the denoted object. xxiv 
 
 Indeed the most striking feature in Hughes’ account is its hybrid nature. 
Denotation is a relation between source and target; while demonstration and 
interpretation are best understood as activities on the part of an interpreter / user. There 
is, of course, an activity of denoting – but this is commonly understood to either 
establish a relation, or ride upon an already established one. In other words, we may not 
use A to denote B without ipso facto establishing a relation of denotation between A 
and B or otherwise employing an already established one. This relation substantially 
informs the notion of representation at play, as revealed by the fact that we speak of the 
geometrical diagram as in itself denoting the kinematical problem, independently of any 
activity carried out by Galileo. 
 
 By contrast, a demonstration is a piece of reasoning carried out by someone 
entirely within the ‘space of reasons’ or framework provided by the model source – 
there is no obvious way to interpret this as a relation of any sort between source and 
target, since at this stage of the modelling process, the target is not taken into 
consideration at all. So, on the DDI account, in order for the geometrical model to 
represent (for us) the kinematical situation, we must carry out Galileo’s demonstration 
ourselves. Here, by contrast with the denotation part, it is the activity itself that is 
constitutive of representation, and there is no relation that may stand in its place. 
 
 Finally, ‘interpretation’, at least as the concept appears in model theory, may be 
understood as a relation. xxv In model theory an interpretation is a function mapping the 
elements of the language into a domain of independent entities endowed with their own 
properties. Hence, take a set of sentences in some particular language; the 
‘interpretative mapping’ is what, on this account, provides them with a ‘semantics’ 
under which they may be said to be true or false. However, this is not the kind of 
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‘interpretation’ that figures in the DDI account, since to the extent that the model source 
contains sentences at all, they already come fully interpreted in terms of the model 
itself. The third step in the DDI account rather corresponds to something that we may 
refer to as the ‘application’ of the model source to the target in order to derive results of 
interest regarding the target itself. And although any application of the model is 
constrained by the relation of denotation established in the first step, it also comes with 
a large degree of freedom in two respects at least, as follows.  
 
 Firstly, the denotation relation stipulates what is the appropriate target for the 
representational source at hand, but it does not stipulate which parts of the target object 
correspond to what parts of the source object. There is plenty of leeway here. For 
instance, in Hughes’ Galileo example, the mere statement that the geometrical diagram 
denote the kinematical situation, does not settle which parts of the diagram stand for 
which parts of the kinematics. Secondly, the denotation relation does not stipulate how 
the source is to be partitioned in the first place, i.e. how it is to be structured into its 
constituent parts in order to be so related to the target. The application of the source to 
the target, however, does require a partition of the source into relevant parts and 
properties (a “structure”), and the relating of such “structure” to a similar “structure” of 
parts and properties in the target. Thus in Galileo’s modelling example, the geometrical 
diagram must clearly distinguish vertical and horizontal lines at every point, and the 
area therein comprised. Similarly the kinematical problem must clearly identify time 
intervals, speed of motion at every instant, and constant or accelerated motion across the 
interval. These distinctions are all products of the activities whereby the users of models 
apply representational sources to their targets – and they are in no way fixed by the 
mere statement that the source denotes the target. 
 
 So, although ‘interpretation’ is constrained by the relation of denotation, it goes 
further, in ways that were not made entirely explicit by Hughes. It requires at least two 
types of activity on the part of the modellers. First of all, it requires the ascribing of 
some structure to the source and target objects, by judiciously partitioning them into an 
appropriate set of parts and their properties. Then it also calls for a mapping of the 
elements of the source structure onto some corresponding parts and properties of the 
target, again under some suitable partition. xxvi Both steps (‘ascribing’ – or more strictly 
‘partitioning’ –, and ‘mapping’) are activities within the modelling practice without 
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which interpretation is rendered impossible.  However, only mapping issues in a sort of 
relation akin to denotation between (elements of) the source and (elements of) the 
target. 
 
 Hughes’ account is therefore a hybrid of a relation (denotation, mapping), and a 
number of activities (demonstrating, ascribing, partitioning). It is deflationary only in 
one sense (no-theory theory), and we may wonder if some extension of the account may 
be fully deflationary in all the relevant senses. Now, the activities are typically regulated 
within a modelling practice that imposes particular norms of correctness. The relations 
by contrast seem to some extent independent of that practice. At the very least, they are 
conceptually distinct, if not pragmatically, since they can be in principle distinguished 
without appeal to the practice itself. We could perhaps say that they are end products of 
the practice, but it would not be right to include them as part of the practice itself. A 
deflationary strategy would recommend replacing both denotation and mapping with 
functional activities or features of the representational practice as well. 
 
 I believe that there are credible functional replacements for both denotation and 
mapping, which I shall refer to as denotative and inferential function, respectively. The 
resulting account may thus be named the Denotative Function-Demonstration–
Inferential Function (or DFDIF) account. It is an extension or version of the DDI 
account that is more faithful to modelling practice in so far as it relates all its various 
components directly to a number of salient features of the practice of model building.   
 
 The first replacement involves substituting “denotative function” (DF) in place 
of denotation. The best way to motivate this replacement is by reference to the recent 
literature concerning the role and nature of fictional representation in scientific practice. 
This literature emphasises the importance and centrality of scientific models that 
represent fictional or imaginary entities, processes, or phenomena. There is no need to 
rehearse here any of the many case studies developed; xxvii it is enough to note that the 
upshot is that any adequate account of scientific representation must accommodate 
representations with fictional or imaginary targets. To give just one illustrious example, 
Maxwell’s famous 1861 vortex model of the ether is a representation whatever 
ontological status its various components, including both vortexes and idle wheels – and 
for that matter the ether itself –, is taken to possess. xxviii  
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 The requirement of denotation would rule out such representations, but as Elgin 
(2009, pp. 77-78) has emphasised, this requirement can be weakened: “A picture that 
depicts a unicorn, a map that maps Atlantis, and a graph that charts the increase in 
phlogiston over time are all representations, although they do not represent anything. To 
be a representation, a symbol need not itself denote, but it needs to be the sort of symbol 
that denotes”.   The paragraph above expresses a residual commitment to the idea that a 
representation only represents something to the extent that it denotes it, xxix but it 
nonetheless rightly emphasises that for a source to function ‘as a representation’ it does 
not need to actually denote its target. The only condition that must obtain is what we 
may refer to as the ‘denotative function’ of the source, and this function can be carried 
out without eventuating in actual denotation. In other words, one crucial difference 
between denotation and denotative function is that the former is a success term (for it is 
impossible for it to be true that ‘x denotes y’ unless y is real) but the latter is not (since 
‘x has denotative function and its purported denotation is y” may be true even though y 
is not real but imaginary or fictional). And while the former (denotation) requires the 
latter (denotative function) the converse is not true – not even in the long term or in a 
hypothetical future.  
 
 A comparison with portrait painting is enlightening at this point. A portrait 
always has denotative function but does not always denote. Velázquez’s portrait of Pope 
Innocent VI both denotes and has denotative function; but it would seem to be a mistake 
to say of any of the series of canvasses that it inspired Francis Bacon to produce that it 
also denotes in spite of the obvious facts that they too are portraits. Or, consider the case 
of Leonardo’s Mona Lisa, which notoriously raises historical questions concerning 
whom exactly it denotes, and how. This question is logically and historically 
independent of the uncontroversial fact that the portrait has denotative function – 
precisely because it is a portrait. Similarly, Maxwell’s models of the ether may not 
denote anything. We nowadays take them to have no referent, and even though 
Maxwell, like any other 19th century physicist – at least at the time that he introduced 
the vortex model of the ether – was certainly committed to a carrier of electromagnetic 
waves, his attitude to both vortexes and particularly idle wheels was more nuanced. He 
thought of both as useful analogies but not as literal descriptions of the mechanisms 
underlying electromagnetic phenomena. The models seem clearly to function 
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representationally nevertheless – there seems to be no substantial difference between the 
methodology we employ for both demonstration and application in such ‘fictional’ 
models and that methodology described by Hughes in the – purportedly – non-fictional 
models employed by Galileo. Any representational work that denotation can perform 
within the DDI account, denotative function seems to perform just as well. Since 
denotative function allows us to account for a much larger family of bona fide scientific 
representations it seems reasonable to substitute denotative function in an appropriately 
extended version of the DDI account. 
 
 A similar move may be made for the ‘mapping’ part of interpretation. The 
crucial function of the ‘mapping’ relation is to transfer over the results of the 
demonstrations carried out on the source onto the target. Thus in Hughes’ example of 
Galileo’s model, the overall area of the triangle is interpreted as the space traversed by 
the body in its motion over the t interval. This is a sort of mapping that thus connects an 
element in the source system (area in the geometrical figure) with an element in the 
target system (space traversed by the body in motion in the kinematical system). The 
point of this mapping in practice is to allow Galileo to carry through some inferences 
with respect to the target, namely to allow him to infer that the time t that a body in 
uniform motion takes to traverse s is identical to the time taken by a body uniformly 
accelerated (from a lesser to greater speed). Hence the functional role of the ‘mapping’ 
relation is to constrain the set of inferences about the target that we may perform on the 
basis of a consideration of the source about the target – i.e. what is technically known as 
the set of legitimate surrogative inferences. 
 
 The deflationary thought is then that this constraint can be stipulated 
independently of any actual relation between the source and the target. In other words, 
“taking area to stand for space traversed” sets up a rule of inference that provides us 
with an equivalent statement to “accepting the conjunction of all the surrogative 
inferences licenced by the rules”, amongst which prominently is the claim that equal 
areas correspond to equal times travelled. There is a sense of mapping or 
correspondence that is preserved here, since certain claims about the source get 
transferred over to claims about the target, but note that this mapping is achieved 
without any need to invoke an independently existing actual ‘relation’ between the 
source and target. What the mapping rather relates, on this view, is a set of claims about 
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the source with a set of claims about the target.  And a mapping between claims of some 
sort and claims of some other sort need not require the establishment of any relation 
between the objects of those claims. In particular, such a mapping does not require that 
B, or A for that matter, be real entities. 
 
 This deflationary thought then sees the ‘mapping’ between source and target as 
merely an inference generation rule that determines the legitimate move from claims 
about the source to claims about the target. Talk about ‘mapping’ then is only genuinely 
responsive to talk about such inferential rules, and a ‘mapping’ is acceptable (or not) if 
the rule that it enacts is correspondingly acceptable (or not). It is in particular not 
possible to assess the propriety of the mapping independently, as it were – by merely 
looking into the source and target properties and assessing their similarity or 
resemblance. For the critical aspect of the ‘mapping’ does not lie in any relation 
between their properties but rather in the generation rule for inferences that it enacts. Of 
course, it is possible that the inference generating rules laid down also coincide with a 
genuine mapping between aspects of a real source and a real target. But this mapping is 
of a piece with the set of generating rules and not independent or prior to it. In particular 
it need not coincide with any recognizable antecedent similarity or resemblance. Thus in 
Hughes’s example of Galileo’s model, we would be at a loss to find any similarities or 
resemblances between the area of the geometrical figure and space traversed in a certain 
interval in the kinematical system – until the correspondence between area and space is 
set, and the set of legitimate surrogative inferences is naturally revealed.  
 
 These replacement moves accommodate fictional representation within the spirit 
of Hughes’ original account. But the moves have the additional virtue to turn the 
account deflationary in the third relevant sense. For as was noted what stands in the way 
of a ‘use-based’ deflationary reading of Hughes’ original DDI account is the appeal to 
mapping and denotation. More generally, the ‘use-based’ account of any concept 
eschews any reference to any substantive relation between that concept and anything 
else other than the use of the concept, or the norms that inform such use. There is no 
explicit or covert appeal to a relation between the concept and the world – beyond the 
aspects of the world that constitute or inform use. In particular, ‘truth’ is not to be 
understood as a relation between sentences and facts, states of affairs or any other 
aspect or parcel of reality. Similarly ‘representation’ is not to be understood as a relation 
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between representational models, on the one hand, and facts, states, effects, phenomena, 
etc, on the other hand. It must be essentially related to features of the use of 
representations instead.  
 
 This is where the other crucial difference between denotation and mapping, on 
the one hand, and denotative and inferential function, on the other, has bite. While the 
former are relations between symbols in a language system and their putative referents, 
the latter are merely features of use. Consequently, the DFDIF account is use-based also 
in the relevant sense of connecting all the essential features of representation to features 
of use within representational practice.  
 
 Let me now turn to the inferential conception. I want to argue that this is 
straightforwardly deflationary in any of the deflationary senses described here – ‘no-
theory’, ‘abstract minimal’ and ‘use-based’. And although these provide no 
‘deflationary strategies’ to develop the inferential conception further, the application of 
each of the three strategies so far discussed does bring into relief different features of 
the inferential conception. Let us consider them in turn. 
 
 From the point of view of ‘no-theory’ deflationism, the inferential conception is 
deflationary in the straightforward sense that it refuses to lay down necessary and 
sufficient conditions on any instances of representation. Representational force and 
inferential capacity are taken to be only general features (and therefore at best necessary 
conditions) on representation, but they are neither jointly nor individually sufficient for 
representation. Normally some other conditions – such as isomorphism or similarity – 
would need to obtain in each concrete case of representation. The underlying thought is 
of course the deflationary one that ‘representation’ is not a genuine, explanatory, or 
substantive concept – and that it therefore does not call for philosophical analysis. 
However, just as philosophers in the deflationary tradition have found a number of 
illuminating things one can say about the workings of the truth predicate in agreement 
with the DS schema, so may we find a number of useful things to say about the 
workings of representation in agreement with the two ‘platitudes’ that appear in the 
inferential conception.  
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 In particular, inferential capacity is minimally informative about the features of 
representation that are responsible for surrogate reasoning. For any representation to 
possess inferential power towards some target it is required that there be some rules of 
inference that connect source and target – yet note that on a deflationary account 
representation is not constituted by those connections in themselves, but by the rules 
that provide the source with the capacity to generate the inferences. Such rules are 
complex features of the practice that involve carrying out demonstrations or 
modifications of the source in order to guide our beliefs regarding the behaviour of the 
target. So there must be two types of inference rules involved. First of all there must be 
rules to the demonstration steps within the model which are consequently internal to the 
workings of the source. These are the rules that govern the process of demonstration in 
Hughes’ account and we may refer to them as vertical rules since demonstration appears 
as a vertical movement in his original diagram (Figure 3). For representation there must 
in addition be rules that cut across this process and connect source and target. These 
rules are set up, or constituted, by what Hughes refers to as the interpretation stage, and 
which we have found more accurately to refer to as application. We may call these the 
‘horizontal’ rules for the similar reasons to those above. The inferential capacity of a 
source is a product of vertical and horizontal rules. The idea that scientific 
representation minimally involves the inferential capacity of sources relative to targets 
is therefore tantamount to the requirement that in some representational practice that 
employs such sources there are established vertical and horizontal rules of inference.   
 
 Now, this is all relevant to the third sense of deflationism considered, namely 
‘use-based’ deflationism; for remember that, on this account, an account of a concept X 
is deflationary if it links it essentially – by definition or otherwise – to features of the 
use of this concept in practice. There is some ambiguity at this point regarding whether 
those features are normative, or merely descriptive. If the latter, there could be 
exceptional patterns of use, but given the widespread diversity of uses of any concept, it 
cannot be ruled out that the resulting account be incoherent. This problem is likely to be 
particularly acute with a concept as widely used as representation. Thus I will here opt 
for the normative option, and assume the mentioned features to be characteristics of the 
norms of use, rather than descriptive of the use itself. This allows for anomalous 
divergence from the norms, and for deviant uses of concepts, but it has the virtue that it 
renders the account internally consistent regardless of such divergence or deviance. On 
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this third deflationary approach, representational force and inferential capacities are 
general features that model sources must have in practice if they are to play a 
representational role at all. In other words, no object (model, graph, equation) may play 
a genuine representational role unless it is normatively ascribed both components within 
a representational practice. If and when particular uses of some sources deviate from 
these two basic norms we are, on this account, to judge them non-representational, at 
least with respect to the practice at hand. 
 
 But as a matter of fact very little will be ruled out by such minimal constraints 
on use. For as we saw in section 2, both representational force and inferential capacity 
are features of activities within a normative practice, and do not stand for relations 
between sources and targets. And the bare satisfaction of these two conditions does not 
impose stringent constraints upon use; on the contrary, there will a vast range of uses 
that satisfy them. Representational force only fails to obtain when a source stands for 
itself only, and allows no surrogate reasoning towards any (fictional or real) target. As 
for inferential capacity, it was noted that it essentially requires normative constraints on 
two types of inference – referred to as vertical and horizontal inferences – but these are 
constraints on the validity of inferences and not the truth of their conclusions. Many 
types of hypothetical reasoning – and any reasoning grounded on idealized assumptions 
– will ensue in conclusions that are false or incorrect. One important task of modelling 
is precisely to pull apart, amongst all those inferences permitted by the constraints, 
those that issue in conclusions that we may assume to be truthful or correct.  The leeway 
is therefore as large as desired in order to accommodate instances of distortion, 
idealized or fictional models. xxx 
 
 Finally, let me quickly consider the second deflationary strategy that I have 
discussed in this essay, namely ‘abstract minimalism’. The inferential conception also 
lends itself naturally to this deflationary strategy. xxxi For, let us suppose that we close 
the definition of representation in terms of the two conditions (representational force 
and inferential capacity) that we have so far taken to be merely necessary, but that we 
do so by turning the concept abstract in the way abstract minimalism requires. We then 
obtain a definition proper of the abstract notion, as follows: “A represents B if and only 
if i) the representational force of A points towards B and ii) A allows competent and 
informed agents to draw specific inferences regarding B” (Suárez and Solé, 2006, p. 
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29). Yet, on the abstract minimalism proposed here considered, to apply this notion to 
any given concrete case of representation requires that some additional relation obtains 
between A and B, or a property of A or B, or some other application condition. Without 
such an additional specification the notion above will remain empty – in the sense of 
lacking any precise application conditions. 
 
 Thus this ‘abstract minimalism’ regarding representation is perhaps best 
understood in terms of the distinction between the means and constituents of 
representation. xxxii The constituents are the necessary and sufficient conditions that 
define the concept. The means are whatever relations or properties of the sources and 
targets are employed by representation users – in the particular context of their 
representational practice – in order to draw conclusions regarding aspects of the target 
by means of some reasoning grounded on aspects or features of the source (what is 
known as ‘surrogate’ or ‘surrogative’ reasoning). On any of the two deflationary views 
first reviewed (the ‘no-theory’ and ‘use based’ version of the inferential conception) 
representation has no constituents, only means (in the case of the ‘use based’ version it 
even makes sense to say that ‘the constituents of representation are its means’). By 
contrast, on the ‘abstract minimalism’ version of the inferential conception, 
representation is constituted abstractly by the platitudes of representational force and 
inferential capacities. And, of course, there are also means of representation – those 
concrete relations and properties of sources and targets that are in fact employed by 
users in their particular context. Yet, this is not a substantive account of representation 
since on this account the constituents explicitly fail to explain the means.  That is, it is 
impossible to determine on account of the abstract definition of the concept what would 
be its conditions of application in any context, since the conditions of application are, 
on this account, underdetermined by its constituents. Thus on this view representation is 
a well-defined property, and moreover one that is not to be identified with any use or 
practice, but it is a property that cannot in any way explain any use or any practice.  
 
 The main insight of abstract minimalism is precisely the thought that there can 
be an abstract definition of the concept so minimal as to lay down virtually no 
constraints on the application of the concept. This does not render the concept empty if 
there are in addition concrete conditions of application – but abstract minimalism denies 
that the concrete constraints must be correspondingly minimal or thin. In other words 
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one can impose very stringent constraints on the application of the concept in every 
domain, without requiring an explanation in terms of the general abstract definition. In 
the case of representation this amounts to the view that the context of use may impose 
highly constrained conditions on the appropriate means of application in that context, 
while remaining virtually silent – e.g. minimal – on the constituents. The view is 
certainly compatible with the inferential conception and aptly reflects the extant 




 In this largely theoretical paper I have aimed at an improved understanding of 
what is meant by the claim that an account of representation is “deflationary”. I have 
distinguished three different meanings of the term “deflationary” and applied them to 
two accounts of representation that have been claimed to be deflationary. In so doing I 
hope to have illustrated the concept of representation, as much as the relevant kinds of 
deflationism. If the analysis provided of the different options is sound, it certainly 
carries consequences for “philosophy of science in practice” (whether the “philosophy-
of-science in practice” or “philosophy of science-in-practice” varieties). The most 
important consequence is that – whatever sense of “deflationary” applied – the analysis 
of the concept of representation, even where feasible, cannot determine its conditions of 
application, and therefore cannot explain its use. These conditions concern the means of 
representation – and these are essentially plural and context-dependent. This strikes me 
as a novel consequence concerning ‘philosophy-of-science in practice’ which has not 
been fully explored yet, and deserves further discussion.  
 
 The second relevant consequence is related to ‘philosophy of science-in-
practice’ and is by now better known and established, namely that a study of the uses of 
a representation is indispensible in order to determine its content. In particular as 
regards scientific models it is a widely accepted view by now that we are not able to 
understand what and how they aim to represent unless we have an understanding of the 
function that these models play in the particular context in which they are employed. 
The discussion in this paper does not perhaps lend further support to this view, except to 
the extent that it provides some theoretical grounds for why it should be true. If the 
concept of representation is deflationary, regardless of how we understand the term, 
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then any understanding that we may possibly acquire of its nature is tied essentially to 
its use. This may be because the concept has no other nature of its own (‘no-theory’ 
theories), because it is too abstract to yield any explanation of its application (abstract 
minimalism), or because its nature is essentially given by its use (‘use-based’ theories). 
No matter what deflationary account, representation only acquires its functional role 
through a particular representational practice. All deflationary accounts have this much 
in common, and it follows that the study of scientific representation must always be 
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Figure 1: Galileo’s geometrical model 
 
 
Figure 2: B. Baker’s representation of the Forth Rail Bridge 
 
 
Figure 3: The DDI model 
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  i	  There	  have	  also	  been	  claims	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  these	  questions	  are	  themselves	  irrelevant	  and	  /	  or	  ill	  posed.	  For	  instance,	  Callender	  and	  Cohen	  (2006)	  argue	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  representation	  that	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  the	  sciences	  is	  essentially	  the	  Gricean	  one	  discussed	  in	  philosophy	  of	  mind,	  and	  there	  are	  no	  particular	  issues	  to	  be	  broached	  in	  the	  scientific	  context.	  There	  is	  no	  space	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  view	  here	  -­‐	  although	  it	  is	  an	  interesting	  question	  whether	  the	  view	  genuinely	  bypasses	  the	  present	  debate,	  or	  rather	  reduces	  to	  some	  form	  of	  deflatonism	  (in	  analogy	  with	  redundancy	  theories	  of	  truth,	  as	  discussed	  later	  on	  in	  the	  text).	  At	  any	  rate	  the	  term	  “representation”	  and	  its	  cognates	  such	  as	  “model”	  do	  appear	  prominently	  in	  the	  scientific	  literature,	  so	  there	  is	  prima	  facie	  a	  legitimate	  philosophical	  question	  to	  address	  regarding	  its	  nature	  and	  /	  or	  function	  in	  science.	  ii	  I	  will	  therefore	  ignore	  the	  ‘primitivism’	  option	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  paper,	  reserving	  the	  term	  “substantive”	  for	  those	  accounts	  that	  are	  both	  substantive	  and	  reductive	  in	  the	  ways	  described.	  iii	  Both	  Pincock	  and	  Weisberg	  accept	  this	  descriptive	  requirement,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  it	  may	  be	  best	  for	  a	  substantive	  account	  of	  representation	  to	  dovetail	  with	  representational	  practice;	  my	  point	  is	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  substantialism	  per	  se	  that	  conceptually	  or	  logically	  requires	  any	  degree	  of	  fit.	  	  iv	  The	  norms	  involved	  here	  exclude	  those	  pertaining	  to	  the	  accuracy	  or	  faithfulness	  of	  the	  model,	  and	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  restricted	  only	  to	  those	  norms	  that	  prescribe	  the	  selection	  of	  appropriate	  targets	  and	  sources	  and	  their	  inferential	  connections	  (what	  I	  will	  later	  refer	  to	  as	  representational	  force	  and	  inferential	  capacities).	  At	  any	  rate,	  the	  basic	  point	  is	  that	  while	  individual	  modellers	  may	  fail	  on	  occasion	  to	  follow	  the	  appropriate	  norms	  of	  their	  representational	  practice,	  the	  concept	  of	  representation	  that	  they	  employ	  cannot	  –	  on	  a	  deflationary	  view	  –	  fail	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  norms	  of	  their	  representational	  practice.	  v	  The	  careful	  formulation	  above	  attempts	  to	  make	  it	  clear	  that	  while	  there	  can	  be,	  in	  a	  particular	  context,	  a	  relation	  between	  model	  sources	  and	  targets	  which,	  in	  that	  context,	  may	  be	  said	  to	  instantiate	  representation	  or	  to	  constitute	  its	  end	  product,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake,	  even	  in	  that	  context,	  to	  identify	  representation	  with	  that	  or	  any	  other	  relation.	  Representation	  is	  rather	  an	  activity.	  vi	  Hence,	  on	  any	  deflationary	  account,	  a	  practical	  inquiry	  into	  representation	  is	  primary,	  while	  any	  
analytical	  inquiry	  is	  secondary.	  (For	  more	  on	  these	  terms,	  see	  Suárez,	  2010).	  That	  is,	  a	  full	  description	  of	  the	  means	  of	  representation	  used	  in	  some	  practice	  enables	  an	  inquiry	  into	  its	  nature.	  Substantive	  accounts	  will	  typically	  order	  things	  the	  other	  way	  round	  –	  they	  will	  assume	  that	  an	  analytical	  inquiry	  is	  prior	  to	  any	  practical	  inquiry.	  vii	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  only	  address	  representation,	  but	  I	  believe	  that	  a	  similar	  distinction	  between	  practical	  and	  analytical	  inquiries	  may	  be	  applied	  to	  discussions	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  ‘scientific	  theory’.	  	  At	  any	  rate	  one	  of	  the	  interesting	  consequences	  of	  the	  contemporary	  deflationary	  zeitgeist	  is	  that	  discussions	  of	  representation	  no	  longer	  hinge	  on	  any	  particular	  account	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  scientific	  theory.	  More	  colloquially,	  we	  could	  say	  that	  ‘deflationism	  has	  emancipated	  representation	  (from	  theory)’.	  viii	  I	  will	  throughout	  gloss	  over	  the	  distinction	  between	  sentences	  and	  propositions	  since	  it	  does	  not	  matter	  to	  any	  of	  my	  purposes	  here.	  There	  are	  deflationary	  theories	  such	  as	  Quine’s,	  and	  arguably	  Ayer’s,	  where	  truth	  is	  predicated	  of	  sentences;	  other	  deflationary	  theories	  such	  as	  Horwich’s,	  and	  arguably	  Ramsey’s,	  appeal	  to	  propositions	  instead.	  ix	  It	  is	  in	  fact	  an	  issue	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  (DS)	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  different	  theories	  here	  reviewed,	  but	  many	  of	  their	  champions	  claim	  them	  to	  be	  so	  compatible,	  and	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  I	  shall	  assume	  that	  this	  is	  generally	  the	  case.	  See	  Blackburn	  and	  Simmons	  (1999)	  for	  extended	  discussion.	  x	  Since	  theories	  of	  truth	  differ	  greatly	  as	  to	  what	  they	  consider	  to	  be	  the	  fundamental	  conditions	  of	  truth,	  it	  may	  be	  more	  appropriate	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  more	  general	  principle	  such	  as:	  ‘P’	  is	  T	  if	  and	  only	  if	  P.	  It	  then	  remains	  open	  whether	  T	  is	  ascribed	  the	  right	  features	  for	  truth.	  I	  gloss	  over	  the	  issue,	  since	  it	  goes	  well	  beyond	  what	  is	  needed	  for	  our	  present	  purposes,	  but	  see	  Wright	  (2001,	  pp.	  13-­‐14)	  for	  discussion.	  xi	  It	  bears	  mentioning	  that	  this	  crude	  theory	  was	  not	  actually	  defended	  by	  any	  of	  the	  traditional	  pragmatists,	  save	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  James	  in	  one	  of	  his	  most	  radical	  moments,	  and	  thus	  hardly	  deserves	  the	  name.	  (For	  discussions	  of	  Peirce’s	  rejection	  of	  such	  a	  crude	  ‘pragmatist’	  theory	  see	  Hookway,	  2000.	  For	  an	  equivalent	  discussion	  regarding	  Dewey,	  see	  Burke,	  1994).	  xii	  I	  claim	  this	  is	  a	  legitimate	  way	  to	  partition	  broadly	  ‘deflationary’	  approaches	  to	  truth,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  insist	  this	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  classify	  such	  approaches.	  The	  distinctions	  I	  draw	  are	  certainly	  driven	  in	  part	  by	  the	  uses	  I	  want	  to	  put	  them	  to	  in	  the	  discussion	  regarding	  scientific	  representation.	  Of	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  course,	  even	  if	  the	  distinctions	  were	  illegitimate	  regarding	  deflationary	  approaches	  to	  truth,	  their	  application	  to	  scientific	  representation	  may	  still	  be	  legitimate,	  and	  enlightening.	  However,	  the	  analogy	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  add	  strength	  to	  deflationary	  approaches	  to	  representation	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  same	  classification	  obtains	  in	  the	  case	  of	  truth	  –	  hence	  the	  extended	  discussion	  of	  deflationary	  theories	  of	  truth	  in	  this	  section.	  xiii	  The	  use	  of	  the	  predicate	  may	  have	  other	  functions	  –	  for	  instance	  it	  helps	  in	  generalization	  and	  quotation	  –	  as	  in	  “everything	  Ed	  says	  is	  true”	  –	  but	  even	  then	  it	  does	  not	  express	  any	  substantive	  property	  –	  it	  does	  not	  establish	  that	  everything	  Ed	  says	  is	  true	  in	  virtue	  of	  any	  substantial	  property	  that	  all	  the	  propositions	  that	  he	  utters	  share.	  	  	  xiv	  The	  distinction	  between	  redundant	  and	  substantial	  properties	  is	  subtle	  but	  it	  does	  not	  need	  detain	  us	  here	  –	  it	  is	  enough	  for	  our	  purposes	  to	  mark	  the	  difference	  as	  one	  between	  a	  nominal	  and	  a	  real	  property.	  A	  nominal	  property	  relies	  entirely	  on	  features	  of	  the	  symbol	  system	  employed	  to	  describe	  or	  denote	  it,	  while	  a	  real	  property	  depends	  on	  the	  constitutive	  nature	  of	  those	  objects	  that	  share	  it	  –	  independently	  of	  how	  we	  choose	  to	  describe	  them.	  Thus	  ‘weighting	  less	  than	  70	  kg.’	  expresses	  a	  characteristically	  real	  property,	  while	  ‘having	  a	  name	  that	  begins	  with	  M’	  is	  nominal.	  The	  distinction	  only	  becomes	  blurry	  for	  those	  properties	  of	  the	  symbol	  systems	  we	  employ	  (e.g.	  properties	  of	  sentences	  or	  any	  other	  entities	  in	  our	  natural	  languages	  –	  such	  as	  ‘being	  seven	  letters	  long’),	  but	  these	  properties	  do	  not	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  analogy	  presented	  here	  (and	  their	  analogues	  for	  scientific	  models	  are	  in	  fact	  expressively	  ruled	  out	  by	  the	  inferential	  conception	  to	  be	  later	  reviewed).	  xv	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  focus	  on	  those	  aspects	  of	  Ramsey’s	  redundancy	  account	  that	  led	  Ayer	  to	  what	  is	  sometimes	  known	  as	  the	  ‘no-­‐theory	  theory’	  of	  truth	  (Ayer,	  1936,	  p.117).	  On	  this	  account	  the	  redundancy	  view	  claims	  that	  ‘truth’	  is	  a	  tool	  –	  for	  disquotation,	  generalization,	  etc	  –,	  which	  does	  not	  deserve	  any	  analysis	  beyond	  whatever	  concerns	  its	  use	  in	  practice	  as	  a	  ‘vehicle	  of	  semantic	  descent’.	  There	  is	  no	  point	  looking	  for	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  for	  ‘truth’	  since	  ‘truth’	  is	  not	  a	  genuine	  concept	  and	  requires	  no	  such	  conditions.	  xvi	  The	  full	  list	  is	  as	  follows	  (Wright,	  1992,	  pp.	  34	  and	  72):	  i)	  to	  assert	  is	  to	  present	  as	  true;	  ii)	  any	  truth-­‐apt	  content	  has	  a	  significant	  negation	  which	  is	  likewise	  truth-­‐apt;	  iii)	  to	  be	  true	  is	  to	  correspond	  to	  the	  facts;	  iv)	  a	  statement	  may	  be	  justified	  without	  being	  true,	  and	  vice-­‐versa;	  v)	  truth	  is	  absolute	  (there	  is,	  strictly,	  no	  being	  more	  or	  less	  true)	  and	  vi)	  it	  is	  stable	  (if	  a	  content	  is	  ever	  true,	  it	  always	  is).	  Wright	  makes	  it	  clear	  (ibid,	  pp.	  72-­‐74)	  that	  all	  these	  platitudes	  of	  truth	  must	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  suitable	  deflationary	  spirit,	  and	  in	  particular	  iii)	  does	  not	  entail	  the	  metaphysical	  relation	  between	  propositions	  and	  facts	  characteristic	  of	  correspondence	  theories	  of	  truth.	  	  xvii	  This	  crucially	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  the	  view	  that	  ‘truth’	  has	  no	  sufficient	  conditions,	  or	  that	  its	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  are	  given	  by	  an	  extremely	  long,	  perhaps	  infinite,	  or	  indeterminate,	  list	  of	  conjunctive	  properties,	  each	  corresponding	  to	  a	  particular	  domain.	  Any	  of	  these	  alternatives	  would	  be	  entail	  a	  radical	  relativism	  according	  to	  which	  there	  is	  no	  unique	  or	  unified	  truth	  concept.	  The	  whole	  point	  of	  abstract	  minimalism	  is	  precisely	  to	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  one	  unique	  truth	  concept,	  it	  just	  so	  happens	  to	  be	  an	  abstract	  one.	  xviii	  I	  am	  not	  claiming	  that	  every	  concept	  necessarily	  is	  susceptible	  to	  one	  of	  these	  strategies	  for	  deflation.	  There	  are	  successful	  substantial	  accounts	  of	  a	  range	  of	  different	  concepts,	  both	  across	  the	  sciences	  (formal	  and	  empirical)	  and	  in	  ordinary	  life,	  and	  philosophers	  have	  often	  excelled	  at	  bringing	  out	  their	  details.	  I	  merely	  claim	  that	  some	  concepts	  are	  deflationary	  in	  that	  they	  resist	  any	  substantial	  or	  explanatory	  analysis,	  and	  for	  those	  concepts	  any	  of	  these	  strategies	  for	  deflation	  is	  available.	  They	  each	  provides	  a	  hermeneutics:	  A	  complex	  interpretative	  framework	  which	  allows	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  concept.	  Other	  deflationary	  strategies	  or	  hermeneutics	  may	  be	  appropriate	  for	  some	  of	  these	  concepts;	  and	  often	  more	  than	  one	  strategy	  will	  suit.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  truth,	  each	  of	  the	  three	  strategies	  has	  something	  going	  for	  it,	  and	  illuminates	  –	  at	  least	  in	  part	  –	  the	  nature	  of	  truth’s	  resistance	  to	  substantial	  analysis.	  Similarly,	  I	  argue,	  for	  scientific	  representation:	  Each	  of	  the	  three	  deflationary	  strategies	  has	  something	  going	  for	  it	  there	  too,	  and	  each	  sheds	  some	  light	  on	  why	  scientific	  representation	  resists	  a	  substantial	  analysis.	  	  	  xix	  I	  am	  therefore	  assuming	  that	  any	  account	  on	  which	  representation	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  denoting	  a	  substantive	  property	  or	  relation	  of	  sources	  and	  targets,	  will	  thereby	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  reductive	  analysis	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  application	  conditions	  of	  this	  property	  or	  relation.	  xx	  A	  standard	  way	  to	  put	  this	  would	  be	  to	  say	  that	  the	  truth	  conditions	  of	  statements	  involving	  representation	  are	  in	  the	  practice	  itself,	  and	  in	  no	  way	  depend	  essentially	  on	  the	  obtaining	  of	  any	  relation	  between	  source	  and	  target.	  There	  is	  to	  my	  mind	  nothing	  in	  this	  standard	  expression	  that	  is	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  objectionable,	  but	  I	  avoid	  the	  expression	  ‘truth-­‐conditions’	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  any	  appearance	  of	  conflation	  or	  collision	  with	  the	  analogy	  I	  develop	  with	  theories	  of	  truth	  in	  section	  3.	  	  	  xxi	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  Baxandall	  (1985),	  as	  well	  as	  further	  documents	  on	  the	  Forth	  Rail	  Bridge	  from	  a	  more	  straightforward	  engineering	  point	  of	  view,	  such	  as	  Petroski	  (1995,	  particularly	  Ch.	  III),	  and	  Shipway	  (1990).	  	  xxii	  At	  the	  point	  at	  which	  it	  had	  been	  decided	  to	  bridge	  it,	  the	  Forth	  required	  two	  bridge	  spans	  each	  500	  m.	  long,	  with	  a	  central	  pier	  at	  Inchgarvie	  Island,	  which	  happened	  to	  conveniently	  lie	  in	  the	  middle.	  Still	  this	  was	  an	  unprecedented	  length	  over	  which	  to	  build	  a	  cantilever.	  Petroski	  (1995,	  p.	  87)	  points	  out	  that	  cantilever	  bridges	  had	  been	  built	  in	  North	  America	  already,	  but	  Baxandall	  documents	  Baker’s	  inspiration	  in	  oriental	  bridge	  designs	  which,	  applying	  the	  same	  principles,	  were	  able	  to	  respect	  symmetry.	  This	  observation	  is	  not	  entirely	  inconsequential	  for	  the	  inferential	  capacities	  of	  Baker’s	  representations	  of	  the	  bridge,	  but	  we	  may	  leave	  it	  aside	  for	  now.	  	  xxiii	  I	  believe	  the	  DDI	  model	  may	  also	  be	  extended	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  abstract	  minimalism,	  but	  for	  reasons	  of	  space	  I	  leave	  that	  strategy	  for	  another	  occasion.	  xxiv	  Goodman	  (1976);	  see	  also	  Elgin	  (1996,	  2009).	  xxv	  For	  instance	  see	  Chang	  and	  Kleiser	  (1990,	  p.	  20)	  which	  informs	  my	  discussion.	  xxvi	  Hence	  the	  source	  and	  the	  target	  are	  both	  regarded	  as	  ‘structures’	  under	  some	  abstract	  description	  suitable	  on	  pragmatic	  grounds	  –	  and	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  application	  to	  the	  target	  conceived	  as	  a	  bare	  system.	  See	  e.g.	  Van	  Fraassen	  (2008,	  p.	  X)	  and	  Suárez	  (1999)	  for	  discussion.	  xxvii	  See	  the	  various	  essays	  contained	  in	  Suárez	  (2009)	  and	  Woods	  (2011).	  xxviii	  Maxwell	  (1861);	  for	  discussion	  see	  e.g.	  Nersessian	  (2008).	  xxix	  A	  commitment	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  move	  away	  from,	  as	  will	  hopefully	  become	  clearer	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  inferential	  conception.	  xxx	  If	  anything,	  the	  inferential	  conception	  has	  been	  criticized	  for	  affording	  too	  much	  leeway	  at	  this	  point	  –	  see	  e.g.	  Bolinska	  (2013).	  xxxi	  As	  has	  been	  argued	  more	  extensively	  in	  Suárez	  and	  Solé	  (2006)	  of	  which	  the	  text	  above	  is	  a	  development	  and	  summary.	  xxxii	  These	  notions	  were	  first	  introduced	  in	  Suárez	  (2003,	  pp.	  229-­‐230).	  
